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Securing a HENP Computing Facility
S. Misawa, O. Rind, T. Throwe
Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, NY 11973, USA
Traditionally, HENP computing facilities have been open facilities that are accessed in many different ways
by users that are both internal and external to the facility. However, the need to protect the facility from
cybersecurity threats has made it difficult to maintain the openness of the facility to off-site and on-site users.
In this paper, we discuss the strategy we have used and the architecture we have developed and deployed to
increase the security the US ATLAS and RHIC Computing Facilities, while trying to maintain the openness
and accessibility that our user community has come to expect. Included in this discussion are the tools that we
have used and the operational experience we have had with the deployed architecture.
1. Background
The RHIC Computing Facility (RCF) at the
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) is the pri-
mary data archiving and processing facility for the
Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC) at BNL. The
US ATLAS Computing Facility at BNL is the US Tier
1 computing facility for the ATLAS experiment at the
Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN. As major
computing centers, these facilities provide a myriad of
services to users that are on-site at BNL and off-site at
collaborating institutions. These services include the
archive storage of raw and analyzed data from the ex-
periments, interactive and batch data processing ser-
vices and general interactive login facilities. Tradi-
tionally, such facilities have been completely open to
the Internet and have provided services, e.g. FTP
(File Transfer Protocol), telnet, IMAP (Internet Mes-
sage Access Protocol), that were not designed with
cybersecurity in mind.
An intrusion into either facility by a malicious in-
truder can result in damages from which recovery can
be extremely costly in time and money. Some of
the difficulty is associated with the enormous facility
“state” represented by the 100’s of terabytes of on line
disk storage and the 1000’s of compute nodes at the
facility. However, this is not the limits of the damage.
Since the facility is part of the data collection process,
disruption of the facility can also result in the loss of
data taking ability at each experiment. This loss is
extremely costly since operating an accelerator is an
expensive undertaking. Finally, because the facility is
the sole archive of a substantial fraction of raw and an-
alyzed data created by the experiments, loss of these
archives from actions by malicious intruders can result
in irreparable damage to on going scientific research.
Although many other computing facilities are at
risk from cybersecurity incidents, two properties make
the RCF and US ATLAS computing facilities high
profile targets. First, the vast amounts of computing
resources make the facilities appealing targets to in-
truders. Second, the location of the facility within a
US government, Department of Energy facility, with
its associated .gov top level domain makes these cen-
ters choice targets for politically motivate malicious
intruders.
With the proliferation of Internet connectivity out-
side of the academic and research communities, the
open data center architecture needs to be modified to
mitigate the increased risk of cybersecurity threats.
2. Securing the Facility
The process of improving the security of the facili-
ties was a multi-stage process. The first step involved
the identification of assets and services at the facili-
ties. In the second step, priorities were assigned to the
identified asset or service with respect to importance.
The third step was identifying the potential threats
to the assets or services. The fourth step was modi-
fying the network topology of the facility to mitigate
the potential threats. The fifth step was replacing in-
secure services with more secure services. The sixth
step was the modification of user and administrator
behavior to increase the security of the facility. The
seventh step was an assessment of the effectiveness
of the instituted changes. The final step was the it-
eration of the proceeding seven steps to continue to
improve the security of the facility.
2.1. Assets and Services
There are a number of assets and services at the
RCF and US ATLAS computing facilities with differ-
ing security needs. The main data store, the High
Performance Storage System (HPSS) [1], contains the
raw and analyzed data that is generated from the ex-
periments. The protection of the stored data and the
operation of the service are paramount to the facility.
Without it, the other components of the facility are
inconsequential. The service provide by HPSS is data
storage and retrieval via an FTP-like mechanism. The
operation of the system is effectively independent of
the other assets and services in the facility.
After HPSS, the next service of importance at the
facility is the authentication and authorization infras-
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tructure, consisting of a cluster of Network Informa-
tion System (NIS) servers. Without account informa-
tion, the compute farm and the NFS (Network File
System) storage are unusable. As a result, the protec-
tion of this information is crucial.
At approximately equivalent levels of importance
are the NFS servers and the Linux based computa-
tion farm. The NFS storage consists of approximately
150TB of disk space and 20 NFS servers. Although,
extremely disruptive, loss of NFS data or service is
not catastrophic. Lost unprocessed data can be re-
stored from HPSS and lost processed data can be re-
covered by reprocessing the raw data. However, de-
pending on the details of the data loss, the recovery
process may be short and simple or long and com-
plex. The Linux based computation farm consists of
approximately 1100 dual CPU systems and 130TB of
local storage. Loss of these systems would halt data
processing and loss of data stored on the local disks
would require reloading of data from the data source
or the recreation of data by reprocessing. As with the
NFS servers, the type of loss would dictate the cost of
recovery.
The wide area accessible Andrew File System
(AFS) [2] storage is at the next level of importance
at the facility. Loss of this service would be incon-
venient for data processing on site. Recovery of data
corrupted AFS storage would entail restoration from
backups, resulting in a maximum loss of about 24
hours of work. Loss of AFS service would definitely
cause major disruption to work at off site locations.
For on site users, loss of AFS service can, if necessary,
be supplanted with NFS service.
The remaining services provided by the RCF and
US ATLAS facilities include web service, Samba ser-
vice, and email service. Although important for the
users, these services are not coupled to the higher
priority mission of the facilities, which is to provide
storage and computational resources to the individual
experiments.
With the assets and services at the facilities identi-
fied, an assessment of the security threats is necessary
to determine the changes that need to be made to
increase the security of the facilities.
2.2. Assessing the Threats
The threats to computing resources at the RCF and
US ATLAS computing facilities fall into two classes,
direct network assaults and compromised accounts.
Examples of direct network assaults include direct at-
tacks on network service daemons (e.g., buffer over-
flow exploits, protocol weaknesses), hijacking of net-
work connections (e.g., replay attacks, forged pack-
ets), denial of service (DoS), distributed DoS, and web
based attacks (both client and server). This class of
attacks do not require login access on a facility system.
Examples of compromised accounts include stolen or
cracked passwords, social engineered access, dead ac-
counts, and malicious insiders. This class of attacks
involve gaining access to a login account at the facil-
ity from which exploits are launched. An interesting
distinction between these two classes of assaults is the
mitigation of network attacks can be more easily ac-
complished with technology and architecture changes.
On the other hand, behavioral changes on the part
of the system administrators or users are usually re-
quired to fix attacks in the compromised accounts
class.
2.3. Facility Architecture
Amodification of the facility architecture is the sim-
pler of the two classes of changes that were made
at the RCF and US ATLAS facilities. (The harder
change being the modification of user and adminis-
trator behavior.) The two main goals of the archi-
tectural modifications were compartmentalization and
isolation. Where possible, unrelated assets and ser-
vices were separated so that security breaches in one
location did result in immediate security breaches in
another location. Also, where possible, network ac-
cessability to assets and services was minimized.
The core facility, consisting of the HPSS servers,
NFS servers, AFS servers, NIS servers and Linux com-
putation farm, were placed behind a firewall with a
“default deny” firewall rule. With the exception of
the AFS servers and AFS service, there is virtually no
direct network access from the outside to the core fa-
cility. In this configuration, the experiment counting
houses, where raw experiment data is generated, are
placed within the firewall.
For scalability and availability, the facility firewall
was a multi-component firewall, consisting of a Cisco
PIX firewall, augmented by ssh [3], secure file transfer
and Samba [4] (SMB) gateways. The gateways were
implemented using general purpose computers run-
ning host based firewalls (ip-filter [5] or iptables [6])
on stripped down and hardened operating system in-
stallations. Each gateway system is equipped with two
network interfaces (NIC), allowing them to bypass the
PIX firewall, thus providing some scalability and avail-
ability. This dual NIC configuration is what dictated
the need for the host based firewalls. The separation
of the ssh and data transfer gateways into separate
systems simplifies the hardening and maintenance of
each system. It also isolates interactive login traffic
with its low latency requirements from data transfers
which are relatively insensitive to latency and typi-
cally result in high system load.
In conjunction with the introduction of the gate-
ways was the elimination of all protocols with clear
text passwords. FTP data transfers were replaced
with scp [3], bbftp [7], and ssh protected ftp. (The
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latter being normal FTP with the FTP control chan-
nel being sent through an encrypted ssh tunnel.) In-
teractive logins via telnet and rsh were replaced with
encrypted logins via ssh. This latter change provid-
ing the additional benefit of protecting X [8] window
traffic.
With the new core facility configuration, triage sce-
narios are possible with respect to intrusions. The
first level would involve disconnecting the facility from
the Internet, thus allowing on site user to work and
on going operations to continue. The second level in-
volves disconnection from the on site network. This
would allow on going operations to continue, includ-
ing data taking, but would cut off on site and off site
users. The third level would involve the shutdown of
all servers and services except for HPSS, thus halting
all operation except data taking.
Located both outside and inside the facility firewall
are multiple web servers. The services provided and
resources used by the web servers are carefully dis-
tributed to the appropriate web server. Located out-
side the firewall is a non authenticating web server,
serving both static and dynamic (aka CGI scripts)
pages. This web server is completely stand alone,
requiring no services or resources from systems in-
side the firewall. Two web servers are located inside
the firewall, an authenticating web server and a non
authenticating web server. The authenticating web
server serves both static and dynamic web pages, but
requires users to authenticate to the server before ac-
cess is granted to the pages. (The authentication oc-
curs over an SSL protected connection [9].) The as-
sumption is that authenticated users, i.e. legitimate
facility users, are not malicious and will not attempt
to exploit weakness that may be present in the dy-
namic web pages. This web server is located behind
the facility firewall because of its dependence on a
core facility service. The second web server located
inside the firewall is a non authenticating web server
that serves only static user pages. Since it depends on
access to user home directories, it resides behind the
firewall. To eliminate the problems associated with
CGI scripts and other dynamic content, only static
pages are served.
The final component of the new facility architec-
ture was the separation of email services from the
core facility. A standalone SMTP and secure IMAP
server [10] was installed outside of the facility firewall.
The email server utilizes a separate password database
that is independent of the password database used for
interactive access to the core facility. This separate
database can potentially isolate the core facility from
email account compromises. In addition, the use of
SSL protected IMAP (replacing standard IMAP) pro-
tects email passwords while they traverse the network.
2.4. Human Factors
Architectural changes to the RCF and US AT-
LAS facilities combined with technology choices sig-
nificantly enhances the security of the facilities. How-
ever, a substantial amount of the security is dependent
on the actions and behavior of users and administra-
tors. As an example, benefits of encrypted ssh con-
nections to the facility are negated if users explicitly
set the X window DISPLAY variable to bypass the
encrypted tunnel, or use telnet to log into the system
from which he/she runs the ssh client. Similarly, sys-
tem administrators can destroy site security if they
are “social engineered” into providing account access
to unauthenticated or unauthorized individuals.
Change user and administrator behavior primarily
consists of education to make people aware of the secu-
rity issues and to provide information on secure ways
of doing tasks. However, education is not exceed-
ingly effective. There is a distinct difference between
awareness and understanding and theory and prac-
tice. Some behavior was enforced, for example dis-
abling of telnet and proactive password checking with
npasswd [11]. Unfortunately, most behavior cannot
be enforced.
3. Operational Assessment
Operational experience that has been collected with
the new facility architecture in place provides informa-
tion about what is working and what is not. As was
expected, migration to the new configuration was a
long and drawn out process, much akin to changing
the direction of an oil supertanker. New tools and con-
figurations needed to be tested, documented and put
into production. In addition, generous lead time was
required so that users could prepare for the system
changes. At this point, the facility has accomplished
the first iteration of the facility hardening process out-
lined at the beginning of the previous section.
The critical components of the new facility are
in the multicomponent firewall, since they represent
the interface to the facility for the users. The most
frequently used component in the firewall are the
ssh gateways. Implemented using four 650MHz In-
tel Celeron PCs, they are each able to handle up
to 80 interactive users running xterms. However, a
single graphics intensive application can saturate the
CPU, resulting in longer latencies for users. Addi-
tional problems have been encountered with scp data
transfers on the ssh gateways. As with graphics in-
tensive applications, a single scp session can saturate
the CPU resulting in responsiveness issues for other
users. The ssh gateways have subsequently been up-
graded to 1.7GHz Pentium 4 systems, providing sub-
stantially improved performance.
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The FTP gateway, currently a dual 800MHz Pen-
tium III system with dual gigabit ethernet interfaces,
has been a little problematic. Getting users to use the
FTP gateway was the first problem that was encoun-
tered. Over time, this has become less of an issue.
An on going problem is the use of sftp and scp for
bulk data transfers. As on the ssh gateways, a sin-
gle sftp/scp transfer can saturate a single CPU. For
a handful of power users, bbftp has worked well for
bulk data transfers since only the control channel is
encrypted. However, its non FTP-like user interface
and its relative obscurity compared to scp and FTP
are a barrier to wide spread adoption by users. Ad-
ditional problems are associated with the use of NFS
mounted disks as a source and destination for data
files on the gateway. The performance of the NFS
disk is a bottleneck for high speed transfers of indi-
vidual files. The installation of local disk is an option
but creates problems with disk space management.
To alleviate some of the performance issues, the FTP
gateway will be replaced with two dual 2.4GHz Pen-
tium 4 systems.
For all components of the firewall, configuration and
maintenance is problematic. The maintenance of the
rules in the PIX firewall to handle the addition, re-
moval, and movement of services is a significant un-
dertaking. Judging the security of new service is par-
ticularly problematic. In addition, some services are
difficult to protect with a firewall. With the host-
based firewalls, the configuration of the rules can be
tricky and can result in unexpected problems.
Finally, significant work is still necessary on audit
trails and intrusion detection on the various firewall
components.
4. Future Work
Operational experience has revealed areas where
modifications can be made to improve site security.
In addition, the Internet and cybersecurity threats are
constantly changing, as a result, defenses need to be
upgraded to handle them. Since most of the security
features in the new facility architectures are designed
to handle the threats circa the late 1990’s, work needs
to be done to deal with new types of threats.
One area of work is the additional hardening of the
“edge” systems, i.e., those systems that are directly
accessible from the Internet. Better understanding of
the issues and technologies makes it possible to bet-
ter protect the systems and the facility. Examples of
these changes include better firewall rules, updated
software, and additional re-architecting of services to
improve security and manageability.
With the proliferation of sophisticated web ser-
vices, the protection of web clients from malicious web
servers is also an idea to be considered. On a similar
vein, proactive institution of firewall rules to mitigate
the risk of the facility being a launch site of a network
attack is also worth considering.
4.1. Grid Services
Looming on the horizon are issues presented by
Grid [12] technology. With the Grid comes new types
of security concerns. One promise of Grid technolo-
gies is the availability of global computation resources
from virtually anywhere in the world. However, this
also adds a new scale to the ramification of secu-
rity breaches, e.g., access to global computational re-
sources to launch distributed DoS attacks and the de-
struction or disabling of resources on a global scale.
With the Grid, responsibilities, facilities and author-
ities become geographically and organizationally dis-
tributed. Command, control and communication be-
come much more difficult.
Operationally, the phasing in of incomplete or
untested Grid services into a production facility has
unknown risks. Additionally, the skill sets and expe-
rience need to manage these new services do not exist
and will likely result in operational errors which may
have dire security consequences.
5. Conclusions
With a modification of the architecture of the RCF
and US Atlas Tier 1 computing facilities, the replace-
ment of insecure services with more secure services,
and the education of both facility users and adminis-
trators, substantial gains in facility security have been
obtained. However, security is an on going process,
not an endpoint. The introduction of new require-
ments and services are making security harder and
security breaches potentially more disastrous. Main-
taining the integrity of the current security profile
while growing the facility and accommodating new
requirements and services will make security an in-
creasingly difficult task.
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